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The Nine Principles of
Reconstruction and
Development
ANDREW S. NATSIOS

T

he US foreign assistance community is in the midst of the most fundamental shift in policy since the inception of the Marshall Plan at the end of
World War II. The events of 11 September 2001 suddenly and unexpectedly
forced the United States to confront a historic challenge equal in magnitude to
the Soviet threat of the Cold War. The tragedy initiated a series of changes leading to the most extensive government reorganization since the Truman Administration created the National Security Council and the Department of Defense.
No agency has undergone a greater degree of internal review and transformation than the US Agency for International Development (USAID). For better or
worse, USAID is on the front lines of the dominating news stories of the day,
whether engaging in reconstruction work in Afghanistan or providing tsunami
relief in South Asia. This renewed prominence is not an accident. On the
contrary, President George W. Bush’s Administration has made development
work a national security priority; the September 2002 National Security Strategy underscores development as one of three strategic areas of emphasis (along
with diplomacy and defense), and clearly states that “including all of the
world’s poor in an expanding circle of development—and opportunity—is a
moral imperative and one of the top priorities of US international policy.”1
This new development climate has brought about internal recognition in the agency that it requires a more uniform and consistent set of guiding
principles, and that these principles must accurately reflect how USAID approaches development from all levels—from day-to-day project operations
to high-level policy decisions. Drawing on more than 40 years of institutional
development experience and building on a series of recent policy strategies,
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including U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century and the Fragile States Strategy,2 this article presents the Nine Principles
of Reconstruction and Development, comprising ownership, capacity building, sustainability, selectivity, assessment, results, partnership, flexibility,
and accountability.
The purpose of this article is to introduce and analyze the Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development to the military community. In a
time of increasing collaboration between the two organizations, it is important that the military gain a better understanding of how USAID and development agencies generally approach their work, and how the two communities
can beneficially build on this cooperation. This article specifically incorporates project-level examples from Afghanistan to better illustrate and provide
context for the Nine Principles. Afghanistan is not presented as an ideal
development context in which to apply the principles, but it demonstrates
how they may apply even in fragile, less-stable environments. Ultimately, the
article contends that the Nine Principles are integral to reconstruction and
development success. When a foreign assistance agency adheres to the Nine
Principles, this greatly enhances the likelihood of success. Conversely, failure to take the Nine Principles into account when designing and managing a
program increases the risk of program failure.
Just as a particularly skilled battlefield commander can violate one or
two of the principles of war and still prevail, a development officer may violate
one or two of the development principles and still succeed. But generally
development agencies ignore these principles at great risk, particularly in
countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan, where major reconstruction efforts are under way.

Background
There are a number of different ways to approach international development. USAID’s White Paper on Foreign Aid enumerates five core development goals: promote transformational development, strengthen fragile
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states, provide humanitarian relief, support US geostrategic interests, and
mitigate global and transnational problems.3 Overall, USAID is the leading
US government agency responsible for promoting peace and stability by
fostering economic growth, protecting human health, providing emergency
humanitarian assistance, increasing literacy, and enhancing democracy in developing countries.
The origins of USAID and the modern US development discipline
can be traced to the end of World War II. Top policymakers of that era realized
that traditional American isolationism was no longer a tenable strategy and argued for a new approach. The cornerstone for this policy shift occurred on 5
June 1947, when Secretary of State George C. Marshall gave a commencement
address at Harvard University and advocated that the United States use its
power and wealth to nurse a world devastated by war back to “economic
health.”4 This speech gave rise to the Marshall Plan and formed the historical
foundation for USAID (the agency was officially established in 1961 by executive order of President John F. Kennedy, combining three existing agencies).
The evolution of US foreign assistance policy is now in its most critical stage since the Marshall Plan. The strategic goals outlined in the National
Security Strategy confirm that a new development paradigm has emerged:
USAID no longer operates on the periphery of US foreign policy. Instead,
there is a broadening recognition that the agency and development work in
general are vital to US national security interests.
One implication of elevating development work as one of the three
pillars of national security is increased collaboration between the military
and development communities. Situations like Afghanistan and Iraq—which
require a broad-based, coordinated humanitarian response—are becoming
increasingly common. More significantly, the success of military strategy
and the success of development policy have become mutually reinforcing.
Development cannot effectively take place without the security that armed
force provides. And security cannot ultimately occur until local populations
view the promise of development as an alternative to violence. Moreover,
while the military is well placed to undertake certain types of stabilization
projects, civilian agencies can relieve the military of many reconstruction
and development projects which it is not well suited to oversee. Thus, it is important that the military gains a clearer understanding not only of how USAID
implements a project or operates a field mission, but a deeper grasp of the
core principles the agency follows when approaching all development work.
At a basic, theoretical level, the Nine Principles of Reconstruction
and Development are inspired by the Nine Principles of War, which are inscribed in modern Army field manuals.5 In the past decade, the military has attempted to forge a closer theoretical link between post-conflict development
6
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work and military interventions. In the mid-1990s, it established the six principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), which served as an
initial bridge between the two disciplines. More recently, especially since
9/11, there has been a growing recognition that conflict should be defined in
more fluid terms; that the line between formal military engagement and informal insurgencies is increasingly blurred. As a result, military thinking has
evolved and now incorporates the phrase “stability operations” as a term of art
to describe post-conflict nation-building efforts.6 Despite this shift, the military continues to use the Nine Principles of War as an intellectual basis for all
military operations, including stability operations (it has folded the six principles of MOOTW into the Nine Principles of War rubric). The Nine Principles
of Reconstruction and Development have evolved from a similar institutional
experience. They distill fundamental lessons from this experience and bring
greater clarity to the operative principles that inform the mission of USAID.

Principle 1: Ownership
Build on the leadership, participation, and commitment
of a country and its people.
The first principle of development and perhaps the most important is
ownership. It holds that a country must drive its own development needs and
priorities. The role of donor organizations is to support and assist this process
as partners toward a common objective.7 It is essential that the country’s people
view development as belonging to them and not to the donor community; development initiatives must meet the country’s needs and its people’s problems
as they perceive them, not as distant policymakers imagine them. Nurturing
country ownership is a laborious process that emerges with time and effort. It
requires a strong agency ground presence in order to build credibility, trust, and
consensus in the local population.
What the people of a community want ultimately counts a great deal,
since their community belongs to them and not to external aid agencies. When
ownership exists and a community invests itself in a project, the citizens will
defend, maintain, and expand the project well after donors have departed. If
what is left behind makes no sense to them, does not meet their needs, or does
not belong to them, they will abandon it as soon as aid agencies leave. It does
take much longer to engage national and local leaders patiently in their own
development than to simply impose it from the outside quickly and autocratically, but the result makes all the difference.
US policy in Afghanistan has emphasized the ownership principle
and has focused on encouraging Afghans to take government leadership positions. The selection of Hamid Karzai as President of Afghanistan is a good
Autumn 2005
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illustration. In December 2001, the four major Afghan factions met in Bonn,
Germany, to select an interim leader. They subsequently chose Karzai to head
the Afghan Transitional Authority. What is significant about this model is that
Karzai is Afghan and his ministers are all Afghan-born as well.8 Karzai has
additionally strived for ethnic balance; the interim cabinet comprehensively
represented all the various political groups in Afghanistan, from Mujahiddin
and Northern Alliance factions to European and American members of the
Afghan Diaspora.9
It is important to have a national lead the country and to have nationals head the ministries for several reasons. First, selecting a national as head of
state provides a much greater degree of legitimacy; the Afghan community will
inherently trust and relate better to an Afghan leader than to an outsider running
the country. Second, having an Afghan leader eliminates the language barrier.
Documents and meetings do not have to be translated, and general communication is facilitated. Third, it is vital that Afghans run the government transition
process themselves; this may be more chaotic in the short-term, but it also
means that Afghans will own the process and ultimately be responsible for the
choices they make. Fourth, an Afghan such as Karzai understands the nuances
of the political situation better than any outsider and is more capable of navigating through problems as they arise. Finally, when attempting to win the
“hearts and minds” of the local population, especially in the midst of Taliban
and warlord turmoil, it is essential to mobilize the Afghan people behind the
government’s policy. One of the most important factors responsible for the
growing stability and prosperity of Afghanistan is this successful mobilization
of the great bulk of the population behind national government policies. This is
best accomplished by an Afghan leader.

Principle 2: Capacity Building
Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills,
and promote appropriate policies.
Capacity building involves the transfer of technical knowledge and
skills to individuals and institutions so that they acquire the long-term ability to
establish effective policies and deliver competent public services. One of its
most important by-products is that the country increases its ability to retain,
absorb, and facilitate economic investment, whether from donor assistance or
from private sources of Foreign Direct Investment. Ultimately, an improved
governance and investment environment is a necessary condition for sustained
economic growth in any country.
The development community recognizes that the right government
policies underscore all successful development efforts. Simply put, a country
8
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with weak governance institutions and misguided policies will have a limited
ability to lead its own economic and social development. For example, it is
not enough to build universities and educate a country’s population. This effort must be accompanied by direct opportunities that will allow university
graduates to become future political and business leaders.
Capacity building applies in the military context as well. For example, in Afghanistan the US military has established the Kabul Military Training Center as part of a $750 million plan to prepare and train a national force
“capable of replacing the militias” that drove out the Taliban in 2001.10 The
expectation is that the US military will transfer necessary technical skills to
the Afghan National Army (ANA), which will gradually assume full responsibility for the country’s security needs.
Among the most important capacity building activities that USAID
implements in Afghanistan are education programs; these are the building
blocks that will foster the next generation of Afghan doctors, lawyers, engineers, and technocrats. Capacity building has occurred in several different
forms. On one level, USAID has directly improved the performance and functioning of the Ministry of Education by providing technical and management
advisers, assisting with curriculum development workshops, and ensuring that
the ministry can manage textbook printing requirements in future years.11 On
another level, USAID has built individual teacher capacity through programs
such as the radio-based teacher training (RTT) program, which targets teachers
who reside in remote areas of the country. As of June 2005, some 65,000 teachers have been trained through broadcasts that strengthen their teaching skills
and spread civic and educational messages. About 7,500 more teachers have
been trained through face-to-face instruction, and 6,800 in an accelerated training program.12 As more teachers have been trained, more children have returned to school: primary school enrollment has increased from a pre-war total
of one million (2001) to 4.8 million as of December 2004.13
The development community accepts the notion that strong human
and technical capacity are necessary prerequisites for stability and economic
growth. Simply put, a country with weak government institutions staffed by
unqualified and inefficient officials will have a limited ability to lead and sustain its own economic and social development.

Principle 3: Sustainability
Design programs to ensure their impact endures.
The core of the sustainability principle is that development agencies
should design programs so that their impact endures beyond the end of the project. Sustainability also encompasses the notion that a country’s resources are
Autumn 2005
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finite and development should ensure a balance between economic development, social development, and democracy and governance. The sustainability
principle forces aid managers to consider whether the technology, institution,
or service they are introducing to a society will have a lasting effect.
Sustainability is equally applicable in the military context. In order
for the military to accomplish its missions, commanders must persevere; they
must balance the need to quickly execute their immediate mission and then depart, on the one hand, with the necessity of developing sustainable local police
and military forces capable of protecting the country in the future against resurgent Taliban or al Qaeda forces, on the other.14 For example, it is not enough for
the US military to train and initially equip ANA soldiers. The best-trained army
will languish and deteriorate without ongoing government support and funding. Sustainability demands that the Afghan government eventually start replacing external military assistance with domestic tax revenues to fund the
Afghan National Army and other public services.
Sustainability is especially important in times of turmoil; if proper sustainable structures are in place, then the project will endure despite surrounding
conflict. A good case in point is the Kajaki Dam in Afghanistan. The dam was
originally constructed in 1953 with funding from the US Export-Import Bank; it
was upgraded with USAID assistance in 1975.15 It has supplied continuous electricity to the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar and consistently provided irrigation water to the surrounding valley. After the invasion of the Soviet army in
1979 and the subsequent withdrawal of US assistance to Afghanistan, the engineers in charge of its maintenance were able to keep the dam operational and productive through 23 years of civil war and Taliban oppression without any
external assistance, supplies, or funding.16 The dam’s remarkable sustainability
has been due to a combination of factors: extensive engineer training that emphasized dam maintenance, durable construction design, and adherence to the
ownership principle—Afghans took responsibility for maintaining the dam
themselves, and they did everything possible to keep it operational.
In contrast, other development efforts in Afghanistan have been less
successful because they have failed to take the sustainability principle into
consideration. For example, one outside agency intended to provide electricity
to a remote village. Rather than extend power lines from a central grid, they
supplied a diesel generator. In the short-term, the village had an ample source
of electricity. In the long-term, this proved unsustainable as the village had no
means or resources to replenish the spent fuel and lacked the technical ability to
repair the generator as required. Sustainability means ensuring that the program’s impact will endure. It entails, for instance, making certain that a nearby
aquifer can adequately support the local population’s long-term water needs
before tapping the source and constructing a water system.
10
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Ownership, capacity building, and sustainability form an iron triad
of principles underscoring all successful and enduring development and reconstruction projects. These principles cannot be applied successfully over
short time periods. They require years of consistent effort and support or they
will fail. There are no quick fixes in successful development. A development
officer ignores these principles at great risk: alienation of the local population
and failed projects.

Principle 4: Selectivity
Allocate resources based on need, local commitment,
and foreign policy interests.
The selectivity principle directs US bilateral assistance organizations
to invest scarce aid resources based on three notions: humanitarian need, the
foreign policy interests of the United States, and the commitment of a country
and its leadership to reform. To maximize effectiveness, donor resource allocation must be targeted where it can have an appreciable impact and where the
recipient community demonstrates commitment to development goals.
In military terms, selectivity closely relates to the principle of
“mass”—concentrate military power at the decisive place and time. The underlying notion is that resources are finite and are most effective when concentrated together in select situations. Any allocation of resources, whether
in combat operations or infrastructure projects, must take into consideration
foreign policy interests, political circumstances, and ground-level need.
President Bush’s Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) exemplifies the principle of selectivity. The MCC is not meant to provide everlasting
across-the-board economic growth assistance. Instead, it focuses on transformational development, fostering far-reaching, fundamental changes so that
further economic and social progress can be sustained without dependence on
foreign aid. Thus, the MCC applies to a specific country archetype: one that
possesses a strong governance framework and which requires large-scale capital investment as a final ingredient toward full-scale development and growth.
To determine which countries fit this transformational development model,
MCC rates countries on a 16-point scale in the broad categories of ruling justly,
investment in people, and economic freedom. It then selects countries eligible
for funding based on a country’s rating.
In Afghanistan, the restored Kabul-to-Kandahar highway illustrates
the selectivity principle.17 More than 35 percent of the country’s population lives
within 50 kilometers of this highway; unfortunately, over two decades of war
and poor maintenance had devastated the road.18 Restoration of the highway was
a high priority for President Karzai and President Bush: USAID was asked to imAutumn 2005
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plement the project over a short time frame of 14 months. The project was crucial
to extending the influence of the new government; the road has led to increased
rates of economic development, it has fostered civil society, and it helps ensure
unity and long-term security in the country.19 In addition, the road circulates
through a significant number of Taliban strongholds, so upgrading the road has
diminished the Taliban’s ability to exert influence in this portion of the country.
The highway is a primary example of the selectivity principle. USAID
factored in the developmental need the highway would serve (access to markets
and cities), the foreign policy interests of the United States (promote economic
development and country unity, counteract Taliban influence), and the commitment of a country and its leadership to reform (President Karzai is an acknowledged reformer with exceptional commitment to the project).

Principle 5: Assessment
Conduct careful research, adapt best practices,
and design for local conditions.
One of the most important tasks a development agency must undertake before designing and implementing a program is to conduct a comprehensive assessment of local conditions. A development agency must consider
several factors in the assessment process: Do reconstruction plans conform to
conditions on the ground? What are the best practices for each intervention?
And what is the absorptive capacity of a society to accept large amounts of assistance? (One of the most serious failures of foreign aid programs is to force
too much money into local institutions that cannot responsibly spend the increased external funding.) Beginning a program without proper assessments
is comparable to initiating a major military campaign against a determined
adversary with no military intelligence: it is a recipe for failure.
USAID’s collaboration with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) in Afghanistan—which are joint civil-military units, each consisting
of 70-80 personnel—offers another illustration of the assessment principle.
Good development demands that an agency conduct ground-level assessments before enacting a project. In select situations, USAID makes use of the
PRTs because they allow civilian personnel to conduct field assessments in
areas that are otherwise unstable because of the presence of Taliban insurgents, regional warlords, drug-financed criminal organizations, and an atmosphere of general lawlessness.20 USAID has been able to monitor critical
reconstruction projects, conduct needs assessments, and mobilize local partners with support from PRT military forces.
Further, in conjunction with the PRTs, USAID must ensure that a
proposed project fits into national ministry plans. One of the primary responsi12
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bilities of a democratically elected government is to provide essential and
needed public services; doing so builds public support and loyalty to the
government. To facilitate this, each ministry in Afghanistan has produced a
strategy which fits into the Afghan national development plan to ensure that
limited resources are maximized—for example, ensuring that new schools are
built in underserviced communities that lack educational facilities. For a project to be effective, a donor must make certain that a potential school not only is
included in the ministry’s strategic plan, but that the ministry has budgeted
funds to support teachers, staff, and textbooks for the school.
Without a comprehensive field-level assessment, it is almost impossible to predict whether a project will have a measurable and definable
effect. The principle of assessment is linked closely to the next principle of
development—results.

Principle 6: Results
Direct resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable,
and strategically focused objectives.
The principle of results is an outgrowth of the assessment principle. It means that before a donor agency even enters a particular country, it
first determines its strategic objectives: What impact do the donor and the
country hope to achieve? Second, the donor and country must consider how
they can best attain the desired impact: What types of programs and resources
will lead to the goal? Finally, the donor and the country must determine what
specific benchmarks will indicate whether they are accomplishing their strategic objectives and whether implemented programs are achieving the intended impact.
USAID incorporates the principle of results throughout all its programs and operations in over 80 countries in which it has field missions. The
rationale underlying this principle is that when an agency is obligated to consider programmatic impact from the beginning stages, this will lead to more
clearly defined and strategically focused objectives. Since 1993, the notion of
managing for results has emerged as an explicit core value of the agency.
When deciding whether to implement a particular project, the agency applies
a “results framework” that visually depicts the objectives to be achieved by
USAID and through the contributions of other donors and actors.
Likewise, the results principle is equally integral to military science.
The principle of the objective directs that “every military operation should
move toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective,” and that
officers must understand strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure these objectives contribute to overall unity of effort.21
Autumn 2005
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Two examples of USAID’s reconstruction and development work in
Afghanistan demonstrate the results principle in practice:
l It is vital that Afghanistan establish a legitimate and democratic
government if it is to achieve a lasting measure of political stability. To assist
in that objective, USAID supported the government of Afghanistan in its October 2004 presidential election. Over 11 million Afghan-born voters registered in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. USAID supported the hiring and
training of approximately 120,000 polling workers by the national election
commission, and it provided support in setting up 22,000 polling stations and
5,000 polling centers. On the 9 October election day, approximately eight
million Afghans voted, 41.3 percent of whom were women.22
l Instability, coupled with the region’s four-year drought, had devastated Afghanistan’s food production capacity. In response, USAID established the Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program (RAMP), which focuses
on all aspects of the agricultural sector, including such elemental requirements as providing seeds and fertilizer, rebuilding rural roads and bridges,
improving access to markets, vaccinating livestock, and extending microcredit lending. To date, RAMP has assisted 588,000 farmers, and has vaccinated 2.3 million livestock per quarter. Its microfinance component has
disbursed more than $700,000 in loans to some 9,500 borrowers. The program has improved irrigation in more than 840,000 acres and established 17
village-based seed enterprises, producing an estimated 4.3 million metric
tons of cereal crops for 2005.23
The National Security Strategy emphasizes that the United States
must “insist upon measurable results to ensure that development assistance is
actually making a difference in the lives of the poor.”24 The principle of results
reinforces this sentiment by requiring development agencies to focus attention
on the actual impact of foreign assistance investment.

Principle 7: Partnership
Collaborate closely with governments, communities, donors,
non-profit organizations, the private sector, international organizations,
and universities.
The partnership principle is a central element of USAID’s business
model and holds that donors should collaborate closely at all levels with partner
entities, from local businesses and private voluntary organizations to government ministries.25 When USAID implements a project, it usually works with a
network of partners; this could include an international nongovernmental organization (NGO) which will exercise direct oversight over an entire program, or a
local university that will implement a civic education initiative.
14
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“The success of military strategy and
the success of development policy
have become mutually reinforcing.”

USAID’s structure varies significantly from the military’s organization. The agency uses a highly decentralized structure where implementation
and much program design takes place in country field missions. The USAID
equivalent of “commanders” is its “mission directors,” and they have much
greater autonomy than counterparts in the military and most other international
aid agencies. USAID missions work in a linear, horizontal organizational
structure that links various voluntary partnerships, many different parts of civil
society, and local and national governments, through voluntary agreements
and funding mechanisms.
An important part of the agency’s mandate in recent years has been to
expand its base of partners and use nontraditional groups who have much to offer to the development community. This includes opening a faith-based office
to accommodate these new, nontraditional groups, and extending its partner
outreach to the business community, working through the auspices of the
Global Development Alliance. To date, USAID has signed more than 285 collaborative agreements, contributing $1.1 billion and leveraging another $3.7
billion in private funding, designed to facilitate work with nontraditional partners such as foundations, private universities, and private corporations.
The partnership principle is a significant component of USAID projects in Afghanistan. One example is the agency’s work with media programs
and radio broadcasters. Radio predominates in Afghanistan; during the war it
was the lifeline for a scattered population, most of whom cannot read. In a
broadcasting environment that had been tightly controlled by the state and
Afghan warlords, where the Taliban had banned the playing of music, it was
important to promote a free and open media and to build a society tolerant of
free expression. To that end, USAID has provided capital and training in message delivery to 32 radio stations throughout Afghanistan, including a commercial radio station network run by Afghan repatriates.26 This network
targets the youth audience of Kabul and other major cities through determined work, willingness to take risks, and financial contributions from its
Afghan proprietors. One station owner states, “We identified a target market
of 15- to 40-year-olds. This is the generation that’s going to have a huge imAutumn 2005
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pact on the future of this country. . . . Elitists think you should tell people
what’s good for them and what’s not good. But we do the opposite—we give
them what they want.”27
When contemplating a project, one of the first things the agency
looks for on the ground is a strong, local partner who can effectively manage
the program from design and assessment to implementation. The agency has
developed a set of analytical tools to determine which potential partners have
the highest likelihood of success.

Principle 8: Flexibility
Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities,
and maximize efficiency.
Development assistance is fraught with uncertainties and changing
circumstances that require an agency to continuously assess current conditions
and adjust its response appropriately. Often, small windows of opportunity appear out of nowhere—for example, a sudden change in top leadership—that
can critically affect donor strategy. The principle of flexibility maintains that
agencies must be adaptable in order to anticipate possible problems and to take
advantage of unforeseen opportunities. On the other hand, flexibility must be
balanced with the fact that good development takes time—nations are not built
overnight, but require continued effort. In the past there has been little inclination to spend sustained amounts of money for long-term reconstruction. The
Bush Administration has adopted a new approach, especially with regard to
Afghanistan. This has allowed reconstruction efforts to be systematized and
done on a large scale.
Flexibility and the principle of maneuver are integral components of
military stabilization operations as well. Because political considerations
guide stabilization efforts, military commanders must remain constantly aware
of the political environment and be prepared to change tactics accordingly.
Moreover, the fact that stabilization operations incorporate such an expansive
agenda—encompassing everything from anti-terrorist exercises to humanitarian assistance—underscores the need for military flexibility.
USAID’s role in the Afghan counternarcotics program illustrates the
importance of being responsive and flexible. In 2004, poppy production in
Afghanistan expanded to more than 500,000 acres, resulting in the opium
economy accounting for 60 percent of Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In response, USAID was asked to create the Alternative Livelihoods Program, which provides Afghans with short- and long-term sources
of income in order to help farmers move out of the poppy economy and into
legitimate agricultural activities. Rural development programs already are an
16
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integral part of USAID’s agriculture strategy; consequently, the agency was
able to refocus the current agriculture program in order to assist and tackle the
poppy problem. By investing additional resources in existing rural growth
programs, focusing on both farm and non-farm employment, and building
upon its relationships with local governments in targeted poppy-growing
areas, USAID is leveraging the Afghan government’s commitment to fighting the opium problem.28 USAID’s experience in alternate livelihood programs in cocaine-producing areas of Latin America suggests they can be
successful only if combined with aggressive eradication and interdiction programs. In a recovering state, such as Afghanistan, the ability to move quickly
and react flexibly as urgent situations arise is essential.

Principle 9: Accountability
Design accountability and transparency into systems
and build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption.
There are two important aspects to the accountability principle: donors
should work to fight corruption in the countries where they operate, and donors
must also ensure that the actual programs they implement are transparent and accountable. Within the US government, oversight bodies such as the Inspector
General, independent auditors, the Government Accountability Office, and
congressional investigative committees help guard against cost overruns, financial abuse, and contractor mismanagement. Externally, development agencies
should ensure that potential projects are not preyed upon by corrupt local officials, and that development programs enhance democratic governance structures and local accountability systems. Political institutions—especially in
developing countries—are fragile, and if these countries lack a strong rule-oflaw foundation then there is an increased risk of corruption.
The accountability principle closely relates to stabilization operations as well. The local population must view the military operation as legitimate, and they must also perceive that their government has real authority.
If corruption takes root, either on the side of the US aid program or on the
part of the host-country government, then the entire principle of legitimacy
is undermined.
In the case of a fragile state such as Afghanistan, applying the principle of accountability is even more important. In such states, the risk of diversion of funds and of corruption is extremely high. Three operating disciplines
have been used in managing programs which have protected projects from
corruption. First, the agency has built-in accountability procedures in its
business model: its procurement and implementation procedures are statutorily regulated by the Federal Acquisition Rules, and offices such as the InAutumn 2005
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spector General perform concurrent audits while the programs are being
implemented to ensure compliance. Second, the agency has limited prime
contracting to major international firms (local firms frequently do not have
the capacity to manage major infrastructure projects), but it has ensured that
the selected firm subcontract to Afghan construction companies. Third, the
agency has supported the Afghan Ministry of Finance to implement a number
of anti-corruption programs, including an extensive customs reform program. In the last fiscal year, such programs enabled customs to exceed its
budget target by 20 percent, constituting about half of all domestic revenue.29
The Kabul-to-Kandahar road project again is a good illustration of the
first two factors in practice. USAID selected the prime contractor, which in
turn subcontracted various pieces to local firms. For purposes of accountability, the agency built in several layers of oversight. First, the agency has an
in-country engineering staff that performed quality assurance inspections of
contractor work and which operated as watchdogs over the entire process. Second, USAID’s Inspector General consistently reviewed financial invoices and
conducted two general audits to ensure regularity and compliance. Third, the
agency contracted with the US Army Corps of Engineers to provide technical
oversight functions over the contractor. The result was that the project finished
to specification and on schedule.30
Based on its institutional experience, USAID follows a standard set
of accountability guidelines. It distributes smaller amounts of money to local
organizations to avoid overwhelming underdeveloped systems. It disburses
funds only after work on a project run by a new local organization is complete
or as bills arrive. The agency seldom provides up-front money to untested implementing organizations. Further, the agency provides significant financial
system training to local groups to build their capacity to handle larger sums of
money. Finally, USAID compiles a list of corrupt organizations and bars them
from receiving future funding. Finally, the agency chooses experienced organizations as primary fiduciary agents in order to facilitate timely and accountable completion of large-scale projects.

Conclusion
The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development are a formalization of customary USAID operating procedures. They reflect key institutional principles that most seasoned aid agencies incorporate in all their work,
from ensuring local ownership and sustainability of a health clinic to flexibly
adjusting a rural development program to counteract poppy cultivation.
The tragic events of 11 September 2001 ushered in a new development and security paradigm; the implications have been far-reaching, and they
extend through all branches of the US government. This new paradigm means
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that an increasing number of complex emergencies and fragile states have
heightened consequences for US national security interests. It is no longer acceptable or appropriate for us to avoid engaging with failed states; there is a
contemporaneous correlation between failed states and terrorist-induced instability. The development community and the military community will continue
to move toward closer and increased collaboration. Already, we are witnessing
the emergence of this shift in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is critically important
that the military and development communities achieve a better understanding
of each other’s comparative advantages and collaborate accordingly. For
example, while the military is the best instrument to enter a conflict environment and provide an immediate stabilizing force, civilian agencies are better
equipped to oversee actual reconstruction and development work.
Finally, it is important to bear in mind two notions regarding the
Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development. First, the Nine Principles significantly overlap with military doctrinal principles. The continued
development of the military’s stabilization operations platform and the increasing frequency of civil-military collaborations means this convergence is
here to stay. Second, effective reconstruction and development work cannot
afford to overlook the Nine Principles. Quite simply, reconstruction is not effective when the local population does not feel a sense of ownership toward
donor programs. Likewise, if donors ignore the accountability principle, not
only does this set a poor example for the local population, but the legitimacy
of the donor’s overall involvement is brought into question. The development
discipline will continue to evolve as will our understanding of it; the Nine
Principles are an important part of this continuing effort.
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